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Decision-Making in the European Water Framework Directive: the Potential 
Consequences of a Neoclassical Approach 
 
By Stuart A. L. Wright1 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper focuses on the decision-making process in the EU Water Framework Directive 
(WFD). The WFD is an important piece of legislation, which will decide the quality of the EU 
aquatic environment for the foreseeable future. The main environmental goal of the Directive is 
good ecological status, to be achieved by 2015. The paper highlights the central role 
disproportionate cost analysis (DCA), the process by which member states can substantiate 
applications for derogation and less stringent environmental objectives, will play in determining 
the eventual quality of the EU aquatic environment. The paper draws attention to a potential 
development path, which the DCA process could take, based on an important guidance 
document on economics in the WFD (WATECO) and the AquaMoney project, a large 
neoclassical project established to produce guidelines for member states as to how to conduct 
DCA, essentially based on economic valuation methodologies, specifically contingent valuation 
and benefit transfer. The paper is critical of this potential approach based on a theoretical 
discussion, which concludes that deliberative approaches to decision-making appear to be more 
appropriate as they better fit the nature of environmental problems.  
The second part of the paper is an analysis of the decision-making process in the WFD. The 
WFD both introduces economic methodologies and public participation for river basin 
management. The paper concludes that the use of neoclassical methods, such as contingent 
valuation, for DCA and the need in the WFD for public participation, represented by active 
involvement, are mutually exclusive and that the level of public participation advocated by the 
WATECO guidance document and the AquaMoney project fails to involve stakeholders actively 
in the decision-making process. The second conclusion is that the use of neoclassical methods 
for decision-making, such as CV and benefit transfer, will have consequences for the European 
aquatic environment in that it will result in the limited effectiveness of the Directive and the 
adoption of less stringent environmental objectives. Finally, the paper proposes an alternative 
decision-making process for the WFD based on a model of stakeholder participation. 
 
Key words: Water framework directive, disproportionate cost analysis, decision-making, public 
participation, deliberative methods, contingent valuation, incommensurability, endogenous 
preferences. 
 
 
1. The Neoclassical Approach to Environmental Decision-Making 
 
When faced with policy options regarding the environment, society needs certain 
methodologies to be able to make decisions. The neoclassical approach to 
environmental decision-making involves monetary valuation, which can be seen as a 
manifestation of a utilitarian worldview, which assumes that nature is subservient to 
the needs and wants of human society. This is a fundamental axiom of western society 
but it has not been universally applicable to all cultures through history nor indeed do 
all individuals in present-day western society hold the view. The manner in which 
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decisions are made is central to the setting of goals for environmental policy. The way 
in which the nature of humans and the environment itself are understood is of 
fundamental importance and differences can radically alter the form of the resulting 
methodologies and hence policy recommendations. A particular methodology has to 
be consistent with the theoretical foundation adopted and the assumptions about 
reality, which it reflects (Crotty, 1998). Welfare theory forms the basis of neoclassical 
environmental economics and the manner in which the valuing agent is 
conceptualised is as a rational utility maximiser who has stable preferences. Both the 
type of rationality adopted and the individual preferences are assumed to be 
independent of the institutional context; that is they are taken to be exogenous (Vatn, 
2005b).  
Essentially, the understanding of behaviour has been extended from the market place 
by neoclassical environmental economists where it is applicable to private goods, 
whereby individuals act to satisfy their preferences within budget and production 
constraints, to the environment, a public good (Jacobs, 1997). Thus, neoclassical 
economics assumes that people hold a utilitarian view of the environment. Adopting a 
model of behaviour, which describes humans as individuals who maximize a 
particular utility function, who consistently adopt the rationality of the market place in 
their daily lives, logically leads to the selection of decision-making methodologies 
based on the commoditisation of the environment into discrete units such as fish or 
groundwater aquifers and their monetary valuation. This will allow people to 
effectively trade in the environmental resources, which are treated as ordinary 
consumption and production commodities, in order to maximise their individual 
utility. In the market place, consumers are assumed to know what is most beneficial 
for them, a concept known in economics as consumer sovereignty. Therefore, by 
applying the same concept to the environment, what is best for society (the social 
goals) are derived from aggregating the consumer preferences of individuals (van den 
Bergh et al., 2000: Common and Stagl, 2005). The result is an efficient/optimal 
resource allocation and an equilibrium outcome, which is equated with being in the 
best interests of society. An important assumption in the preceding is that individuals 
follow a utilitarian philosophy with regards to the environment and are able and 
willing to consider tradeoffs in relation to the quantity and/or quality of 
environmental public goods (Spash et al., 2006). 
The theoretical assumptions in neoclassical economics about how the individual 
behaves and the nature of the environment logically leads to the application of the 
methodology of cost benefit analysis (CBA). According to neoclassical theory, the 
setting of goals regarding the environment necessitates the establishment of the total 
economic value (TEV) of environmental resources. However, the problem with 
environmental goods is that they have no price, as they are not traded, which tends to 
result in their overexploitation, a situation known as market failure. Therefore, market 
failure has to be corrected, which can be done by creating a simulated market through 
the use of CBA in order to establish the TEV of the environmental goods in question.  
In environmental economics, TEV is composed of direct use, indirect-use and non-use 
values. Direct use value includes the physical utilisation of nature, such as logging but 
also in the form of recreational usage and the extraction of natural resources and 
groundwater (Bateman et al., 2002). Indirect-use values take the form of 
environmental life-supporting functions, such as the assimilation of waste products 
and carbon fixation (Bateman et al., 2002) but also include option value, which is the 
value that the individual attributes to the possibility of enjoying the natural good at a 
later point in time (Bateman et al., 2002). Finally, non-use value is subdivided into 
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existence value, in which an individual experiences satisfaction from the knowledge 
of the mere existence of the natural good, due to a feeling of responsibility or duty to 
preserve species and ecosystems (Bateman et al., 2002), and testamentary value, 
which originates from the individual’s desire to preserve and protect natural goods out 
of concern for the opportunities of future generations (Bateman et al., 2002). 
Several methods of CBA have been developed to determine the economic value of 
environmental resources, however, only stated preference methods can deal with non-
use values of environmental resources and so, in theory at least, these approaches can 
account for the TEV of the resource in question. Contingent valuation (CV) is a 
widely used stated preference method in which respondents to a survey are typically 
asked to state their willingness-to-pay (WTP) to preserve a particular environmental 
asset. The derived WTP of the respondent goes directly to the correct monetary 
measure of the change in utility derived from the change in environmental quality 
(Perman et al., 2003). One of the main benefits of achieving good ecological status 
under the WFD will be an increase in biodiversity resulting from the improvement in 
habitats for species. Biodiversity is defined as a non-use value and therefore the CV 
method, based on stated preferences, can be expected to be used.  
Regulatory agencies and financial institutions are faced by time and resource 
constraints. In response to this, benefit or value transfer is a technique, which has 
been developed in environmental economics to circumvent the need for costly and 
time-consuming original research to establish the value of particular environmental 
resources. The technique involves the transposition of monetary environmental values 
estimated through economic valuation methods from a former study site to a current 
policy site (Brouwer, 2000). Whilst an effort is made to apply previous research 
results to similar decision situations information is applied in a different socio-
economic and environmental context.  
As discussed, in neoclassical environmental economics, the environment is seen as a 
catalogue of goods providing specific waste disposal services or specific commodity-
like inputs, whilst the valuing agent is assumed to hold a utilitarian perspective of the 
environment and is characterised as a rational utility maximiser whose preferences are 
stable and unaffected by the social context. This theoretical world-view logically 
leads to the use of CBA and monetary valuation when decisions are required 
regarding the environment. However, the neoclassical approach to decision-making is 
controversial and there is a vast and growing literature, which questions its efficacy. 
A proportion of the literature focuses on the fundamental assumptions of the 
neoclassical model; the question is how accurate is the neoclassical perspective of 
human nature and the environment, which underpins its methods? 
 
2.  Some Problems with the Neoclassical Approach to Decision-Making 
 
There follows a brief discussion of selected aspects of the continuing controversial 
debate over the validity of monetary valuation. As one of the major benefits of 
achieving the WFD target of good ecological status in European waters will be an 
increase in biodiversity, a non-use good, it can be expected that a neoclassical 
approach to decision-making or goal setting will involve the use of stated preference 
methods, specifically contingent valuation (CV) and the technique of benefit transfer. 
Therefore, the discussion will focus on CV and benefit transfer and two dimensions of 
the critique of neoclassical methods, endogenous preferences and the 
incommensurability of values. These have been selected because they question the 
legitimacy of the neoclassical understanding of the nature of the valuing agent and the 
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environment upon which monetary valuation is based.  
 
2.1 Stable preferences, Stable Constructs or Endogenous Preferences? 
 
By way of testing the assumption that rationality and hence preferences are not 
influenced by social institutions, as asserted in neoclassical theory, Vatn (2005a; 
2005b) refers to empirical studies from behavioural and experimental economics, 
which apply game theory (Gintis, 2000; Forsythe et al, 1994 quoted in Vatn, 2005a). 
In particular, the results of ultimatum, dictator and public goods games show that the 
behaviour of participants diverges from the neoclassical assumption of selfish 
behaviour, in that a significant proportion are willing to share and cooperate, implying 
that their actions have been governed by fairness and reciprocity. The behaviour of 
the participants is dependent on their own personal propensity for ‘other-regarding 
behaviour’ but also on the institutional context; the way in which particular games 
frame choices. For example, naming a public goods game ‘Wall Street Game’ or 
‘Community Game’ influences the degree of participation even if the gains and losses 
are identical (Vatn, 2005a). Bowles (1998:87) reached a similar conclusion earlier, 
referring to the ‘construal effects’ of markets, whereby markets affect ‘relational 
preferences’ which appear to be held by people. The perceived relationships among 
exchanging parties, and related concepts of fairness, influences the terms on which 
people are willing to transact, as borne out in the above empirical studies. One of the 
main conclusions is that preferences are affected by context i.e. the institutional 
setting and are therefore endogenous, which runs contrary to the neoclassical position 
of context independent or exogenous preferences.  
Dealing explicitly with decision-making in environmental policy, Vatn (2005a; 
2005b) uses the term ‘value articulating institutions’ (VAIs) (after Jacobs, 1997) to 
define the range of methods used to capture the values people hold regarding the 
environment, which includes CBA, multi-criteria analysis and participatory processes. 
According to Vatn (2005b), VAIs define who shall participate and in which role. 
Therefore, in a CV study, respondents are supposed to act as consumers whilst in a 
participatory processes they are supposed to act as citizens on behalf of society (Vatn, 
2005b). The use of CBA and CV influences respondents to adopt a utilitarian view of 
the environment and an individual utility maximising rationality, which in turn 
governs preferences, through directing respondents towards monetisation and trade-
offs, whilst participatory methods such as the citizen’s jury, influences respondents 
towards the adoption of a social rationality by facilitating a communicative process. 
Also, VAIs define what is considered relevant data and how data is to be handled. 
Vatn concludes that the CV method itself influences the preferences of respondents.  
 
Veisten (2007) refers to work by ecological and institutional economists and other 
social scientists who he claims have based their critique of CBA and CV on the works 
of Amartya Sen. Sen (1979:1987) develops the idea that individuals behave in a self-
interested way as consumers in the marketplace but may adopt other behaviour such 
as altruism when taking the role of, for example, a voter. Veisten (2007) continues 
that critics of CV assert that requiring respondents of CV to adopt the selfish role of 
consumer for decisions regarding the environment is morally dubious as the 
environment is a common good demanding respondents act as citizens to determine 
what is best for society. By way of negating this argument, Veisten makes the point 
that a complete schism between egoist behaviour in shops and altruist behaviour in 
social foras seems unrealistic, referring to green and ethical consumer markets, as an 
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example where the rationality adopted does not follow the logic of the institution. The 
complete schism to which Veisten refers is indeed unrealistic but more recent authors 
within institutional and ecological economics have developed this thread further 
concluding that institutions influence not determine the rationality adopted (Bowles, 
1998; O’Neill and Spash, 2000; Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Vatn 2005a; 2005b). 
Whether or not a particular individual will act in accordance with the rationality 
fitting the institutional context also depends on his/her personal propensity to act in 
such a way. The institutional context is, however, still credited with playing a 
significant role in resulting behaviour, as supported by the empirical studies above. So 
recent research has evolved from the dichotomous representation of homo economicus 
acting in the market and homo politicus acting in social forums to a more subtle and 
realistic interpretation.  
 
The manner in which the environment is conceptualized is a central determining 
factor for which decision-making methodologies becomes appropriate. Institutional 
and ecological economists (Common and Perrings, 1992; Vatn and Bromley 1994; 
Bromley, 2005; Common and Stagl, 2005) describe a complex environment-society 
system in which people are linked together through their acts, which impact on the 
environment due to biological and physical processes. Thus, releasing wastewater into 
a lake may result in a decline in biodiversity, which can affect others in a variety of 
ways from recreational impacts, such as a reduced possibility for fishing, to reducing 
the resilience of the aquatic environment entailing more significant consequences. 
Therefore, the preferences of one influence the opportunities of another (Bowles, 
1998; Vatn, 2005a). Due to these interlinkages between species, ecosystem processes 
and humans, and between humans and other humans, authors (for example: Vatn, 
2004; 2005a; 2005b) define the environment as a common good, rather than as a 
public good as in neoclassical economics. This is in recognition of the fundamentally 
ethical nature of choices about the environment, as the choices and subsequent actions 
of individuals concerning the valuation and use of goods such as biodiversity, has an 
impact on the quality of the environment that is left for others including the extent to 
which they are exposed to future risks. Thus, a social interconnectedness is imposed 
on humans as a result of the linkages existing in nature (Vatn, 2004).  
Therefore, decisions regarding the environment are primarily seen in terms of 
resolving contested choices or conflicts (VALSE, 1998; Anand, 2000; Vatn, 2004; 
2005a; 2005b; O’Neill, 2007). However, the CV methodology has no scope for 
respondents to consider the consequences of their individual environment choices for 
others as it frames the issue in terms of what the change in environmental quality is 
worth to the individual. The inherent interlinkages between individuals are disguised. 
As Bowles (1998:105) puts it, “The influence of our preferences on others is not even 
approximately captured by contracts.” This illustrates how the efficient solution 
derived from the aggregation of individual WTP bids does not necessarily result in a 
socially optimal outcome and thus the relevance of economic efficiency as a societal 
goal is brought into serious question.  
 
An example of the manner in which a CV survey encourages strategic behaviour is 
provided by a recent study (Olsen et al., 2005). The Motorways versus Nature CBA 
concerned two potential motorway layouts in the Silkeborg area of Jutland, Denmark. 
The one, which was chosen, would join together two existing stretches of motorway. 
The first proposal was the Resendal layout, north of Silkeborg, whilst the second was 
the Ringvej layout, through Silkeborg town itself. The aim of the CV study was to 
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ascertain the preferred motorway layout by eliciting WTP valuations from 
respondents within the affected population. When asked what their preferred location 
for the Silkeborg motorway would be, a number of the respondents to the 
questionnaire were motivated, not by a consideration of the relative environmental 
impacts of the two choices, but by a concern that the motorway should ‘not be in my 
back yard’ (Hence the term NIMBY, which was coined to describe such a 
phenomenon). Therefore, a number of respondents, who were based within Silkeborg 
itself, revealed a WTP for the motorway to be built through the conservation areas, 
simply because then it would be as far away as possible from their homes. 
Conversely, a percentage of those located outside Silkeborg, and closer to the 
proposed route through the Sminge and Gødvad areas, revealed a WTP for the 
motorway to be constructed through Silkeborg town itself, for the same reasons 
(Olsen et al., 2005). This provides a clear example of an instance in which relying on 
personal preferences can provide an outcome, which does not appear to be in the best 
interests of society as a whole. From an institutional perspective such an outcome is 
perhaps unsurprising as the CV format fosters strategic behaviour. Because choices 
are interlinked, what is individually rational, or sensible to do, may in such situations 
be collectively detrimental (Vatn, 2005b).  
In response, authors (Røpke, 1999; O’Neill and Spash, 2000; Vatn, 2005a; 2005b, 
O’Neill, 2007) recommend deliberative decision-making methods for the setting of 
goals regarding the environment, which support social rationality and influence 
participants to assume the role of citizens in a process of communication over what is 
right to do.  
 
2.2  Lexicographic Preferences, Plural Values and Incommensurability 
 
“(Neoclassical) Environmental valuation rests on the idea that benefits and costs can 
be expressed in terms of money and hence made comparable and commensurable” 
(Aldred, 2006:141). However, many authors discuss values regarding the 
environment as being plural and incommensurable (see for example: O’Neill, 1998; 
O’Connor et al., 1998; Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Røpke, 1999; van den Bergh et al., 
2000; De Marchi and Ravetz, 2001; Vatn, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Aldred, 2006; Trainor, 
2006; O’Neill, 2007; Farrell, In press) in that the value of the environment cannot be 
measured in terms of the single metric of money, or indeed any other metric. An 
example of how people hold values other than exchange values when it comes to the 
environment is provided by the occurrence of lexicographic preferences, which are 
linked to deontological ethical views or a rights-based approach to the environment 
(Spash, 1997). Such respondents reject the implicit trade-offs required in CV studies 
in relation to the quantity or quality of public goods (Spash, 2006). This can be due to 
a belief in the rights of species or ecosystems to existence or be protected from harm. 
For these individuals, engaging in a process that places monetary values on certain 
aspects of nature may violate their ethical position. Spash (2000) proposes a modified 
form of lexicographic preferences suggesting that individuals first need to secure a 
minimum standard of living before being prepared to defend the environment, which 
is perhaps a more realistic interpretation of the position. 
The assumption of neoclassical economics, however, is that individuals adopt a 
utilitarian view of the environment (Spash, 1997), as being composed of discrete 
units, such as fish or trees, which can be traded just like private goods in the market 
place. Hence in neoclassical theory, the sole form of environmental value is exchange 
value as represented by money. 
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The valuation of biodiversity has received particular attention in the literature with 
reference to lexicographic preferences (Spash and Hanley, 1995, Spash, 2002; Vatn, 
2004; Spash et al., 2006; Veisten et al., 2006). According to neoclassical theory, 
biodiversity represents a non-use value, which requires the use of stated preference 
methods. Thus CV essentially requires respondents to buy and sell improvements in 
biodiversity (Spash et al., 2006), which is a situation in which lexicographic 
preferences are likely to occur due to the belief of certain individuals that species 
have a right to existence. Such individuals will then reject the commodification of 
environmental resources (Spash et al., 2006). 
Thus respondents with rights-based views often protest against the valuation 
procedure by not responding, stating a zero bid or providing an outlier bid. The 
accepted way of dealing with such responses in the CV literature is to discard them, 
as they are assumed to either demonstrate that the individual confers no value on the 
environment or is irrational. Consequently, authors (Sagoff, 1988; Spash, 1997) have 
labeled the CV method undemocratic as respondents rejecting monetary valuation due 
to a rights-based approach are excluded from the process and are in effect 
disenfranchised.  
Recent research (Spash et al., 2006) appears to contradict the long-standing 
assumption that respondents who hold a rights-based perspective of the environment 
will reject the CV survey outright rather than take part in the process and provide a 
WTP bid. Results from the study indicate that approximately 43% of respondents 
provided a WTP bid on the basis of non-economic reasoning (Spash et al., 2006). 
This apparent anomaly is explained by the fact that respondents tend to want to 
cooperate with CV researchers. Such an explanation of the behaviour mirrors the 
work done by several authors (Bowles, 1998; Vatn 2005a; 2005b), which confers a 
degree of influence to the institutional context on the rationality and hence 
preferences of individuals i.e. that they are endogenous rather than being exogenous 
as espoused by neoclassical theory. 
Veisten (2007:219) refers to studies on biodiversity (Spash and Hanley, 1995; Stevens 
et al 1991), which have reported lexicographic motivated responses of approximately 
25%, a level which he considers to be potentially problematic, especially due to a 
systematic upward or downward bias due to ethicists’ misrepresented preferences but 
also on moral grounds whilst he further acknowledges that it might undermine the 
validity of the CV in its primal application.  
Veisten et al. (2006) conduct tests of inconsistent attitudes to estimate the maximum 
share of strict lexicographic preferences for biodiversity. The results of the study 
indicated that there were ‘very few’ respondents who showed a clear reluctance to 
trade-off biodiversity with other goods. Veisten (2007) then concludes that ‘die hard’ 
lexicographic ethicists may be considerably less than a quarter. Even if the percentage 
of respondents with true lexicographic preferences is significantly less than a quarter 
as claimed, such preferences are incompatible with the economic theory upon which 
CV is founded, as acknowledged by Veisten et al. (2006). Therefore, it must still raise 
serious doubts about the democratic legitimacy of the method and the validity of its 
results, as such individuals do exist.  
Due to this apparent inability of the CV method to incorporate the views of rights-
based individuals, it appears unavoidable that the monetary values collected will fail 
to represent the broader values individuals associate with the environment and by 
assuming respondents hold a utilitarian view of the environment the motives that lie 
behind responses will be misinterpreted (Spash, 2000a). Thus, monetary valuation 
results in significant information loss. The implication is that this will have a 
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delegitimising effect on environmental policy, which is implemented on the basis of 
the results of such a CV study. This conclusion is supported by a study by Clark et al. 
(2000), which revealed that respondents to a CV study did not understand the 
reasoning behind the WTP elicitation procedure. When they were later told that the 
data were to be used in a CBA to support environmental decisions many felt deceived.  
Incommensurability of environmental values is used as a basis for asserting that 
environmental problems represent a boundary to the market institution due to the 
moral and ethical status attributed to the environment. Hence the environment should 
not be treated as a commodity open for exchange in markets due to the failure of CBA 
to account for ethical and moral values held by some individuals, which renders 
monetary valuation morally dubious, much in the same way as there is broad 
consensus that market boundaries should exist concerning trading in children, certain 
drugs or weapons of mass destruction (Aldred, 2006). The environment is composed 
of objects of moral concern and is thus more than just economic resources (O’Neill 
and Spash, 2000; O’Neill, 2007). 
An additional argument for why the environment should represent a boundary for the 
market in terms of decision-making methodologies focuses on the complex nature of 
the environment itself. Vatn and Bromley (1994) claim that a commodity must be 
precisely demarcatable before it can be valued. However, environmental goods, as 
identified by economics, are in fact components within larger ecosystems 
characterised by a web of functional relations, which makes their division into 
discrete units impossible, biodiversity being a case in point.  
Martinez-Alier et al. (1998), emphasise that plural values regarding the environment 
are incommensurable but are not incomparable. Rather they are represented by weak 
comparability in that the conflicts that characterise the environment are unavoidable 
but are compatible with rational choice employing practical judgement. Practical 
judgment can be operationalised with the use of deliberative decision-making 
methods. 
A further method of monetary valuation, which is becoming increasingly popular, is 
the technique of benefit or value transfer. According to Brouwer (2000:137), the 
technique is controversial because of reservations amongst academics and politicians 
regarding the usefulness and technical feasibility of economic valuation tools to 
demonstrate the importance of environmental values in project or programme 
appraisals. Brookshire and Neill (1992) stress that an inextricable relationship 
between non-market benefit estimation and benefit transfer techniques exists in that 
benefit transfers can only be as accurate as the initial benefit estimates. Therefore, the 
discussion in the previous section, which questions the validity of the CBA 
methodology, is also applicable to benefit transfer as the technique is based on the 
same underlying theoretical assumptions regarding the nature of the valuing agent and 
the environment.  
Spash and Vatn (2006:383) focus on the issue of plural values representing “social 
and moral commitments of a non-consequentialist and non-utilitarian kind” as a 
motivation for WTP bids in primary valuation studies and how such motivations are 
context dependent. In other words, the ‘value’ of the environment is dependent on the 
stakeholders who feel attached to the particular area in focus. Changing the location 
of an environmental resource will place it in a different cultural milieu populated by a 
society who will attribute different values to the specific resource derived from their 
distinguishing character, sentiments, moral nature or guiding beliefs, in short their 
ethos. Context dependency also relates to the bio-chemical characteristics of specific 
environmental features. For example, a lake at one location, rather than being a 
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discrete demarcatable commodity, is a part of a larger aquatic ecosystem to which it is 
connected in complex ways, performing various functions including waste 
assimilation and providing a habitat for species. To say that one lake performs exactly 
the same functional role as another lake in a different country at a different time 
seems untenable, regardless of any superficial similarities they may share such as 
size, recreational usage etc. It seems unavoidable that benefit transfer will result in 
significant information loss regarding value due to incommensurability. Taking 
values from one biophysical, economic, temporal and spatial situation and 
transferring them to another will only result in the generation of “theoretically 
meaningless numbers” to borrow a phrase from Spash and Vatn (2006:387). 
 
3.  Summary  
 
It appears that the manner in which neoclassical economics understands the nature of 
the valuing agent and the environment is only a partial understanding in the case of 
the valuing agent and is incorrect in the case of the environment. A more complete 
understanding of the valuing agent acknowledges that not all humans hold a utilitarian 
perspective of the environment, that humans are multi-rational with certain 
individuals being more inclined towards selfish behaviour than others, whilst 
rationality and hence preferences are influenced by the institutional context. 
Meanwhile the environment is not composed of a series of commodity-like resources, 
which are demarcatable. Rather the environment is better conceived as a complex 
system of interlinked processes. Monetary valuation, which is based on the 
neoclassical worldview, doesn’t fit the reality of the decision-making process due to a 
reductionist perspective of human nature and the environment.  
The previous discussion has questioned the validity of neoclassical value articulating 
institutions. Values, such as moral and ethical judgments or ecological functions, have 
been identified as being incommensurable and are thus irreducible. By forcing a 
utilitarian ethic onto respondents to CV surveys and reducing information to monetary 
figures, the method leads to a significant loss of information. This is likely to be even 
more pronounced in the case of benefit transfer, which ignores the central role context 
plays in the determination of value, both on the part of the ‘valuer’ and the object to 
be valued. The consequence of this information loss is the misrepresentation of ethical 
values as utilitarian and the disenfranchisement of respondents, who reject the 
commodification of the environment. This can undermine the legitimacy of 
subsequent policy based on CV studies. The preceding discussion challenges the 
concept of economic efficiency as a guide to environmental policy.  
Deliberative decision-making methods allow individuals to articulate ethical 
perspectives, which would be discarded or misrepresented in a CV study, and thus 
have the potential to address the problems of legitimacy connected with monetary 
valuation. The conceptualisation of an environment-society system logically favours 
deliberative decision-making methods that make the relationships between individuals 
explicit. Protest bids and the general controversy surrounding monetary valuation 
raises doubts over the appropriateness of asking individuals how much the 
environment is worth to them personally, as the consequences of individual choice 
fall not only on the individual, but on others as well. Such a situation seems to require 
the question “What ought society to do?” (VALSE, 1998). Also, If preferences are 
endogenous then the preferences of participants in deliberative methods can change 
through a process of communication and reasoned argument with fellow participants, 
whilst preference endogeneity suggests that the deliberative forum itself will 
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influence the rationality adopted by participants, supporting social rationality, or 
citizen behaviour. It seems useful to imagine what might have happened if a 
deliberative method, such as a citizen’s jury, had been used to decide the preferred 
motorway layout around Silkeborg instead of the CBA study that was undertaken. In 
such circumstances, those respondents who were motivated by a desire to locate the 
motorway as far away as possible from their homes would, as participants, have had 
to openly discuss their motivations with others or attempt to disguise them. Attempts 
to disguise strategic behaviour are difficult in a communicative arena, as these 
participants would have to invent alternative reasons for their choice, which would 
probably appear implausible to fellow participants.  
Of course, deliberative forms of decision-making come with their own set of 
problems (see VALSE, 1998; O’Neill and Spash, 2000; De Marchi and Ravetz, 2001; 
O’Neill, 2007) but the method appears to fit the nature of environmental problems 
better.  
 
4.  Section 2: Decision-making in the WFD 
 
The next section will be concerned with an analysis of the EU Water Framework 
Directive (WFD) to determine whether recent research findings, which question 
monetary valuation, have ‘trickled down’ to inform European policy. Initially, the 
focus will be on the broad measures contained within the WFD to establish the extent 
to which they reflect the more complete interpretation of the nature of the valuing 
agent and the environment, as discussed above. The core of the analysis is concerned 
with the decision-making methods used by member states to establish whether the 
costs of achieving the environmental target within the Directive are disproportionately 
costly, as a justification for derogation and less stringent environmental objectives.  
Finally, an alternative model of stakeholder participation for decision-making in the 
WFD is suggested on the basis of the perceived advantages to be gained from a 
participatory approach resulting from its foundation on a more complete theoretical 
understanding of the nature of the valuing agent and the environment. 
 
4.1  The Ecological Economics of the WFD 
 
The WFD (2000/60/EC) was adopted in 2000 and has been described as an ambitious 
holistic reorganization of EU water policy (Fyns Amt, 2003). The Directive is the 
most substantial piece of water legislation ever produced by the European 
Commission, and will ultimately set common approaches and goals for the 
management of water in 27 countries, providing the major driver for achieving 
sustainable management of water in the EU for many years to come. The Directive 
introduces the main environmental objective of good ecological status (GES), which 
is to be achieved by 2015, and requires member states to introduce river basin 
management based on the natural geographical and hydrological unit. Member states 
must prepare river basin management plans for each basin containing implementable 
measures to achieve GES.  A draft plan must be produced by 2008 whilst the final 
version is to be implemented by 2009 with plans thereafter being updated every 6 
years.  
Aspects of the WFD reflect concepts which would by advocated by ecological 
economists, regardless of whether this was intended or not. The interpretation of 
ecological economics in the following brief discussion is in line with the subdivision 
of the field that questions the dominant paradigm of neoclassical economics. A recent 
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development in the field of ecological economics has been an increase in studies 
using traditional neoclassical methodologies, such as cost-benefit analysis, as 
evidenced by reference to the International Journal of Ecological Economics (Røpke, 
2005).  
The environmental target of GES is one, which has not been decided through an 
economic process in order to find the optimal level of pollution. Rather it is one that 
attempts to establish a baseline for an undisturbed ecosystem. One of the major 
benefits of achieving GES will be an increase in biodiversity, which has been 
identified as being central to the protection of ecosystem resilience, as the diverse 
gene pools act as a form of insurance against ecosystem collapse, and a sudden loss of 
biological productivity and reduced capacity to support human life, by increasing the 
capacity for adaptation to stresses and the maintenance of the ecosystem’s 
organisational and functional structure (Holling et al., 1995). The UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity (2003) identified the ecosystem level as being the appropriate 
basis for describing biodiversity. This is reflected in the WFD, which introduces river 
basin management, requiring in many cases new administrative structures to be 
established based on the scale of the entire ecosystem instead of traditional 
administrative borders. Thus, a systems approach is required in which each river basin 
(the ecosystem) determines the boundaries of the socio-economic system that is to 
become sustainable. In effect, GES places a constraint on economic activity, which 
should be adjusted so as to ensure the resilience of the aquatic ecosystem. However, 
in cases where achieving GES would result in ‘disproportionate costs’ there are 
opportunities for derogations including less stringent environmental objectives. 
Ecological economists would stress the importance of maintaining the resilience of 
aquatic ecosystems, due to the vital role they play in supporting society, and thus 
might underline the significance of achieving GES. However, it is unrealistic to 
expect that GES can be realised in all water bodies. It is also unclear whether it is 
necessary to achieve GES in all water bodies to ensure the resilience of the aquatic 
environment. Furthermore, making GES the overriding aim could compromise other 
important societal aims, such as ensuring a minimum standard of living, for example. 
So the option of applying for derogation enables a balance to be struck between 
environmental, economic and social goals. This then serves to highlight the central 
role the methodology that is used to provide evidence for derogations will play in 
striking this balance and deciding the eventual status of the European aquatic 
environment.  
Furthermore, the WFD requires that member states encourage the active involvement 
of all interested parties in the implementation of the Directive, in particular the 
production, review and updating of the river basin management plans. This reflects 
the importance attributed to public participation in the Fifth Action Programme on the 
environment (European Commission, 1993), in which it is identified as being the 
conditio sine qua non for the realisation of sustainable development. Thus, the 
participation of the public is seen as being a key process for sustainable water 
management. Functowicz and Ravetz (1993:744) have highlighted the expediency of 
involving an extended peer community in an age of post-normal science in which 
“facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” as an 
effective problem-solving strategy for global environmental risks. 
Finally, the WFD fully institutionalises economic approaches to water resources 
management in the EU. The introduction of economic instruments is required, such as 
full cost water pricing to include resource and environmental costs and instruments, 
such as taxes on nitrogen inputs to agriculture, are options for the programme of 
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measures in river basin management plans to realise GES. These instruments can 
contribute to the sustainable management of scarce resources by encouraging more 
rational use of water due to its increased economic value. They can be in accordance 
with ecological economics, assuming some conditions are met, i.e. taxes should be 
based on a standards and pricing procedure as opposed to deriving the tax rate from 
the optimal level of pollution (Common and Stagl, 2005).  
Therefore, the WFD appears to contain concepts, which would be advocated by 
ecological economics. However, the manner in which disproportionate cost analysis 
(DCA) will be conducted, as a basis for establishing whether the programme of 
measures to achieve GES is disproportionately expensive, in order to support an 
application for derogation, including less stringent objectives, could see a departure 
from ecological economics.  
 
4.2  The Recommended Approach to Goal-Setting in the WFD  
 
In order to achieve the goal of GES, a river basin management plan (RBMP) must be 
compiled for each river basin district in the member state. Each RBMP should contain 
a programme of measures, detailing how GES will be achieved. A variety of possible 
measures are open to member states. Some examples include wetland restoration, 
water metering, water efficiency projects, the creation of semi-natural habitats, the 
extensification of farming practices and input taxes on farming chemicals (WWF, 
2006). Economic assessment will then play a crucial role in contributing to the choice 
of which of a range of possible measures should be included in the RBMPs (WWF, 
2006:7). The range of measures available in each river basin will first be subject to a 
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) in order to select which measure, or combination of 
measures, would achieve GES at least cost. This will be followed by disproportionate 
cost analysis, which will be conducted to assess whether the proposed measures, 
which would achieve GES at least cost, are too costly. Article 4 of the WFD (CEC, 
2000) permits member states to apply for various derogations on the basis of a DCA. 
DCA can be used on the following four occasions. 
 
• Designating heavily modified water bodies. A water body may be 
designated as heavily modified when the beneficial objectives served by the 
modified characteristics cannot be met by alternative means that are not 
disproportionately costly (Article 4.3).  
• Extended deadlines. The deadline for achievement of GES can be extended 
from 2015 for up to two further updates of the RBMP i.e. until 2021 or 2027. 
This is permitted if the realization of GES by 2015 would be 
disproportionately expensive (Article 4.4) 
• Less stringent environmental objectives. These can be pursued if the 
achievement of GES would be disproportionately expensive even with an 
extended deadline (Article 4.5). 
• New Modifications. New modifications that cause status deterioration are 
permitted when the beneficial objectives served by the new modification 
cannot be met by alternative means that are not disproportionately costly 
(Article 4.7). (Such new modifications must also satisfy a series of further 
conditions, including that they be of overriding public interest, and 
‘sustainable’).  
 
Thus, it is quite clear that DCA will play a central role in determining the extent to 
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which significant improvements in the European aquatic environment will be 
achieved.   
 
4.3  What is DCA?  
 
The above raises the question of when do costs become disproportionate? 
Disproportionality is an ambiguous concept, which could be decided in a variety of 
ways. Indeed, the precise method by which member states should determine 
disproportionality is not specified in the WFD. Thus, it could be expected that 
mainstream approaches will dominate. This together with other ambiguous terms in 
the Directive and the lack of a statutory requirement to achieve GES enables member 
states to avoid the status objectives without any legal implications, although member 
states have an enforceable obligation to prevent any further deterioration in water 
quality (Kallis and Butler, 2001). A neoclassical approach to disproportionality would 
identify it as being the point where monetary costs exceed monetary benefits, which 
can be calculated by cost-benefit analysis (CBA). Such a process would require that 
the environment be valued in monetary terms, specifically the increase in water 
quality, and all the ensuing benefits that that would entail, such as increased 
biodiversity, resulting from the realisation of GES. Such a procedure would require 
use of the CV method to capture the non-use value of biodiversity.    
The common implementation strategy for the WFD has produced a guidance 
document on economics and the environment for member states, which provides 
general guidelines for member states on how to conduct DCA (WATECO, 2003). 
This document advises against the use of CBA to determine disproportionality by 
stating that disproportionality is ultimately a political judgment informed by 
economic information and that disproportionality should not begin at the point where 
measured costs simply exceed quantifiable benefits due to the uncertainty of estimates 
of costs and benefits (WATECO, 2003). Furthermore, according to WATECO (2003), 
the assessment of costs and benefits will have to include qualitative costs and benefits 
as well as quantitative.   
 
4.4  The AquaMoney Project 
 
There follows an examination of the AquaMoney project by way of drawing attention 
to the possible manner in which disproportionality may come to be determined by 
member states seeking to apply for derogations to the environmental objectives of the 
WFD.  
The AquaMoney project consists of a consortium of 16 leading European research 
institutions supported by an advisory committee of 24 stakeholders and decision-
makers. The rationale for the project is to develop and test practical guidelines for the 
assessment of environmental and resource costs and benefits in the WFD due to the 
perception that these concepts play a central role in the economic analysis of the 
WFD, in particular (and with specific relevance to this study) for the decisions on 
exemptions on grounds of disproportionate costs (Article 4) (Aquamoney). The 
practical guidelines will facilitate the creation of a common valuation design to be 
applied across 10 European pilot river basins, which will facilitate investigations into 
techniques for transferring economic values for environmental and resource costs and 
benefits across water bodies and between rivers. According to the AquaMoney 
website (AquaMoney), special attention will be given to the production of lists of 
transfer values for the different goods and services provided by aquatic ecosystems 
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and environmental damage categories associated with different types of water use. 
This is ostensibly to develop practice-oriented guidelines on how to assess 
environmental and resource costs and benefits in a quick and reliable way, with 
particular focus on the transfer of economic values of environmental and resource 
costs and benefits from water body level to national and international river basin level 
and vice versa (AquaMoney). Reference to the Danube case study of the AquaMoney 
project provides an example of the approach advocated by the project to 
operationalise DCA as a basis for possible derogations under Article 4 of the WFD. 
The case study maintains that the main objective of the monetary valuation exercise 
will be to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the WFD programme of measures to 
underpin possible derogation (AquaMoney). The economic valuation methods 
proposed are contingent valuation for the assessment of non-use values and travel cost 
for use-values, whilst the benefit transfer technique is highlighted as being a key 
methodological issue.  
From the previous description it is quite clear that the theoretical foundation of the 
project is neoclassical environmental economics with its reliance on monetary 
valuation to inform decisions regarding the environment. 
It is, of course, not possible to predict how widespread the techniques advocated and 
developed by the AquaMoney project for assessing disproportionality will become in 
the EU. However, considering the scale of the project, the number of participating 
institutions, supporting stakeholders and decision-makers coupled with the fact that 
the guidelines will be tested by carrying out economic valuation case studies in 10 
different European river basins including the Rhine and the Danube, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that it can be expected that the guidelines will be used to 
establish disproportionality in river basins in the EU.  
Therefore, the DCA process to support applications for derogation, including less 
stringent environmental objectives, could well be based on economic efficiency. 
 
4.5  The Decision-making Process in the WFD 
 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993:750) claim that the extension of the peer community is 
required in an age of post normal science, which occurs when “Uncertainties are 
either of the epistemological or ethical kind, or when decision stakes reflect 
conflicting purposes among stakeholders.” River basin management fits this situation 
and thus warrants the extension of the peer community to include stakeholders to 
discuss what level of water quality is desirable and what measures are acceptable to 
achieve it. Recent years have witnessed a growing acknowledgement of the 
synergistic effects to be harnessed from involving stakeholders in decisions, which 
are of direct consequence to them. With regards to water management, the advantages 
were recognized at a relatively early stage and articulated by principle no.2 of the 
Dublin Statement (UN, 1992) thus, 
 
“Water development and management should be based on a participatory 
approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels…. It 
(public participation) means that decisions are taken at the lowest 
appropriate level, (subsidiarity) with full public consultation and 
involvement of users in the planning and implementation of water 
projects.”  
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With general relevance to the environment, the Aarhus Convention (1998) states that, 
“in the field of the environment improved access to information and public 
participation in decision-making enhance the quality and implementation of 
decisions” (EC 1998:2). From its earlier inclusion in strategic documents public 
participation has become directly included in policy, the case in point being the WFD. 
Within the WFD, the active involvement of the public is encouraged. Indeed, active 
public involvement has been identified as being most likely the key to success with 
regards to achieving the desired water quality objectives (Common Implementation 
Strategy, 2003).  
However, it seems that contradictory approaches to water management are emerging 
within the WFD between the need for active public participation, involving an 
increased democratic process, on the one hand, and economic decision-making, 
involving a closed technocratic process, on the other. It is the opinion of this paper 
that the two are mutually exclusive. This development could be attributed to the 
vagueness of the Directive and the lack of obligations for member states to adopt 
specific methods. An explanation for this could be the manner in which the WFD was 
created over a period of 5 years, finally requiring a conciliation process between the 
Council of Ministers, representing member states, and the strongly pro-environment 
European Parliament (Kallis and Butler, 2001; Kaika and Page, 2003), the result 
being compromise between two bodies with substantial differences in position.  
Arnstein’s ladder of participation (1971) provides a categorisation of levels of public 
participation ranging from manipulation to full citizen control as illustrated in Figure 
1, below.  
 
Citizen Control 
 
Delegated Power 
 
Partnership 
 
 
 
Degrees of 
Citizen Power 
 
 
Placation 
 
Consultation 
 
Informing 
 
Degrees of 
Tokenism 
Therapy 
 
Manipulation 
 
Non-
participation 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Eight rungs of the ladder of citizen participation (Source: Arnstein, 1971) 
 
 
The advantages that are to be gained from public participation can only be realised if 
a certain amount of control is given to stakeholders, from the level partnership and 
upwards. Public participation can be interpreted in several ways. The Public 
Participation Working Group for the WFD (2003) defines it as “allowing people to 
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influence the outcome of plans and working processes” and like Arnstein 
distinguishes levels of participation, which should build on each other from 
information supply to consultation and finally active involvement. Information supply 
refers to providing access to the general public to background information. 
Consultation relates to the public having the right to react to plans and proposals 
developed by the authorities, while active involvement refers to stakeholders actively 
participating in the planning process by discussing issues and contributing to their 
solution (Public Participation Working Group, 2003). 
However, what is being proposed by WATECO, and the manner in which the 
decision-making process is developing according to the AquaMoney project, points 
towards a procedure dominated by economic analysis. The decision-making process 
proposed by WATECO for river basin management plans is illustrated in Figure 2 
below, (adapted from WATECO, 2003 and WWF, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The Economic Decision-Making process for the Selection of Measures in River Basin 
Management Plans (Adapted from WATECO, 2003 and WWF, 2006). 
 
Initially, cost-effectiveness analysis will be used to select which measures are able to 
achieve GES at the lowest cost. Achieving GES at the lowest economic cost is in 
itself a worthy objective; in a world of scarce resources governments and voters don’t 
want to spend more money than is necessary. However, the CEA methodology 
determines which measures can achieve the target at the least cost per unit of 
reduction but such measures can have side effects, which may be environmental and 
social. Thus, CEA effectively filters out potential options at an early stage as the 
economic aspect of measures takes precedence over other considerations. For 
example, a CEA may establish that GES can be realised at least cost in a particular 
Programme of measures 
River basin management plans 
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river basin by constructing a water treatment plant. Nevertheless, these plants have 
other environmental side effects, such as greenhouse gas emissions derived from 
intensive energy use thereby contributing to global warming and sea level rise 
essentially exacerbating the original problem. Such plants represent an end-of-pipe 
engineering solution, which treats the symptoms of aquatic pollution not the cause, 
which would entail preventing pollution from diffuse sources. It is therefore 
questionable whether such a solution is sustainable. Environmental side effects should 
be included in the costs of measures but this demands that environmental costs are 
monetarised and thus CEA is essentially a constrained form of CBA and will face 
many of the same problems (Spash, 2000b). The decision regarding the initial 
selection of potential measures to achieve GES should be about what measure or 
combination of measures can achieve GES at the lowest acceptable cost all side 
effects considered qualitatively. Thus, the cheapest measure may be rejected due to 
unacceptable social and/or environmental side effects. This indicates that stakeholders 
should also be actively involved in the process of selection, as they bear the direct 
consequences of selections.  
Figure 2 vividly depicts the subsidiary role of public participation, as informing and 
consultation. Whilst this level of participation allows stakeholders to hear and be 
heard, they lack real power or influence to ensure that their views are heeded by the 
powerful (Arnstein, 1971). Furthermore, informing and consultation is clearly to be 
introduced at a late stage of the planning process, essentially after decisions have been 
taken. The introduction of this restricted form of public participation ex post will 
result in stakeholders having limited opportunity to influence the programme of 
measures for their benefit. Thus, it appears that the level of public participation 
advocated by WATECO amounts to informing and consultation, (defined as degrees 
of tokenism according to Arnstein’s ladder of participation (Arnstein, 1971). 
Whilst the WATECO guidance document (2003) explicitly states that DCA should 
not be operationalised by CBA, the AquaMoney project is focused on precisely this 
and ultimately on the production of ‘price lists’ for water resources, thereby taking the 
commoditisation of the environment to the extreme. Birol et al. (2006) refer to the 
central role of public participation in the WFD and consider the use of CV and other 
economic valuation techniques as being a way to incorporate public participation into 
decision-making processes. However, it is considered that the involvement of an 
individual in a CV study amounts to a very restricted form of public participation and 
certainly falls short of the active involvement which has been identified as being 
central to the success of the Directive. Active involvement is blocked by the CV 
format due to the incommensurability of environmental values and the scope for 
misunderstanding the purpose of the survey and the lack of scope of the method to 
give a voice to respondents who reject the strict utilitarian approach to the 
environment on ethical grounds. Furthermore, the CV format provides no forum for 
stakeholders to discuss issues or contribute to their solutions, which is required if 
active involvement is to be realised (Public Participation Working Group, 2003). 
Furthermore, according to Brouwer (AquaMoney, 2006), the public should be 
informed after the valuation process to notify them of the outcome of the economic 
analysis and to explain the findings of valuation studies through public hearings or 
meetings with local community leaders. Therefore, consulting and informing the 
public ex post exacerbates the problems inherent in using an economic approach to 
decision-making. 
The WATECO guidance document and the AquaMoney project are advocating the 
imposition of a utilitarian perspective on decisions regarding the aquatic environment 
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across the EU, which will soon encompass 27 countries. However, the preceding 
theoretical discussion rejects the assumption of a universal utilitarian epistemology. 
Both the WATECO guidance document and the AquaMoney project involve limited 
public participation and fall short of the desired active involvement. Such a process 
will be ineffective at drawing out the potential benefits to be had from public 
participation. Indeed, the use of CV and benefit transfer for decision-making as 
advocated by the AquaMoney project could have the opposite effect in that it could 
result in the disenfranchisement of stakeholders rejecting the commoditisation of the 
environment and the disillusionment of stakeholders regarding policies decided in 
river basins on the basis of what is essentially a top-down, closed technocratic 
approach. Thus, it is considered that the application of neoclassical decision-making 
methods will result in the limited implementation of the WFD. Due to the 
inappropriateness of the economic approach it is considered that the entire decision-
making process from deciding appropriate measures to deciding whether measures are 
disproportionately costly in river basins should be opened up to active stakeholder 
deliberation, moving public participation from the periphery to the centre of the 
decision-making process to create a multi-dimensional, multi-stakeholder 
participatory approach. 
Stakeholders could then decide whether GES should be achieved in their river basin 
based on a balanced assessment of the costs of measures; costs here meant in a 
broader sense to include economic, social and environmental. Such a process would 
see economic decision-making methods essentially removed from the WFD and river 
basin management. Economic methods would be restricted to the initial economic 
analysis of the river basin and for compiling information on the economic costs of 
various measures for achieving GES. Such quantitative financial costs would only 
represent one aspect of the broader costs including social, environmental and cultural 
to be considered by stakeholders assessing measures and disproportionality. The steps 
involved in the proposed model of stakeholder participation for decision-making in 
the WFD are illustrated in Figure 3 below.  
Stakeholder deliberation could be operationalised through the use of deliberative 
decision-making methods, such as citizen’s juries, thereby instilling active 
stakeholder involvement in the planning process and imparting a degree of citizen 
power on participants, as recommended by the Public Participation Working Group 
(2003). This appears to be a more suitable method for handling the conflicts of 
interest and incommensurability of values, which characterise water resource use in 
river basins.  
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Figure 3. An Alternative Stakeholder Participation Decision-Making Process for the Development 
of River Basin Management Plans 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The WFD is an important piece of legislation, which will provide a framework for the 
management of Europe’s aquatic environment into the foreseeable future. The manner 
in which the decision-making process is conducted, in particular DCA, will play a 
central role in determining the eventual quality of European waters. The two main 
conclusions of this study are that the level of public participation advocated by the 
WATECO guidance document and the AquaMoney project fails to involve 
stakeholders actively in the decision-making process. The second conclusion is that 
the use of monetary valuation for decision-making, such as CV and benefit transfer, 
will result in the limited effectiveness of the Directive and the implementation of less 
stringent environmental objectives.  
Effectiveness Analysis 
Choosing Measures to achieve 
GES 
Stakeholder Deliberation 
Effective combinations of 
measures considered to assess 
whether acceptable and 
whether costs are 
disproportionate to the benefits 
of achieving GES.  
Costs of particular combination 
of effective measures 
considered by stakeholders to 
be proportionate to benefits 
derived from GES 
Costs of combination of 
effective measures considered 
by stakeholders to be 
disproportionate to benefits 
derived from GES 
Natural science 
Quantitative 
Relevant sources and form of 
information feeding into 
decision process 
Economic, social, environmental, 
cultural and political  
Qualitative 
Quantitative (financial costs)  
 
RBMP 
Recommendation to achieve 
GES along with effective 
measures acceptable to 
stakeholders 
RBMP 
Recommendation for time 
derogation or alternative 
environmental objectives 
 20 
Ultimately, someone will have to pay to achieve GES but the question is who? Will it 
be the farmers, the water companies, the consumer? River basin management is 
characterised by many competing uses for what is an increasingly scarce resource, 
thus there will be winners and losers in final decisions. Informing and consulting with 
stakeholders after a policy decision has been taken, which puts the costs of achieving 
GES at their door, arrived at through a theoretically flawed closed economic process, 
which misrepresents or discards ethical views and disguises the inherent conflicts in 
environmental decisions by not providing a forum, which allows stakeholders to 
argue their case whilst hearing the arguments of others seems like a potentially 
inflammatory way of goal setting in the WFD. 
According to the first page of the WFD legislative text (2000/60/EC),  
 
“Water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage, 
which must be protected, defended and treated as such.”  
 
It has been argued here that a neoclassical approach to decision-making can only treat 
water as a commercial product due to its foundation in utilitarianism and its narrow 
concept of value as exchange. To remain true to this central positional statement and 
to facilitate greater acceptability, transparency and effectiveness of implementation of 
the Directive, the decision-making process and DCA should not be operationalised by 
neoclassical methods but should rather encompass a true participatory process, which 
acknowledges the political nature of decision-making for the environment. 
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